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DDI-1305-75

13 May 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : DIA Biographic Study

1. This memorandum is based upon an illicit copy of "Report of the Task Force on the DoD Biographic Program", dated 31 March 1975. No action should be taken nor discussion initiated with any member of DIA until formal receipt of the document.

- 2. I do not have any problems with the Findings of the report because they accept totally the CIA study of the DIA biographic effort (Para 5a (1)-(5)). The findings also admit (Para 5b (1)) that most DoD biographic needs are for protocol reasons, and that most of the subordinate elements have need for data on low-level (non-national) types. The Army and JCS wish to continue the FMPCP -- the contacts with foreigners program (OK). The commands want an automated biographic program to assist in fulfillment of their assigned biographic missions; the commands also want an automated national level bioprogram. All admit that the biographic effort within the military structure has duplication, inefficiencies, etc.
- 3. The Recommendations in the paper are a different kettle of fish (left too long in the sun.) Recommendations begin on Page 5 (Para 6), are double spaced and cover four pages. They have no particularly discernible relation with the Findings and are divided into Collection, Storage and Retrieval, Production, Other and Implementation. They are based on Option 4 of Tab 8 (Pages 8-3). I have two fundamental and basic objections to the whole of the recommendations.
- 4. The recommendations would put the national biographic effort into a National Biographic Intelligence Production Center (NBIPC) and provide support to the commands through some sort of DIA controlled computer index that is not well defined. NBIPC would be under IC staff direction in conjunction with IHC and the Human Sources Committee, etc. This type organization would create a

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superstructure not now existant and requiring new personnel and slots. Responsibility for priorities, organization, etc. would be separated from the people who would do the work and I foresee a mess. Such a structure would require the dissolution of CRS's ISG, restore the old Register type organization, and leave the nonbiographic ISG functions homeless and probably undoable with existing manpower. The structure would add to nothing except DIA's id. They wouldn't be out of the business -- they'd be in a joint system. The NBIPC also gives DIA a place to hide their not-so-hot biographic analysts.

- 5. The proposal to create a computerized index of DoD raw biographic reporting plus CIA and DIA finished biographic reports is an attempt to satisfy the biographic needs of the commands and relieve the national center of responsibility for handling lower-level military personalities. It would be based upon an existing DIA computer file and, given the terms of reference the task team had in mind, could be done without much difficulty. It does, however, mean that DIA will continue to insist that their field collectors report on DIA Form 1396, a cumbersome device that probably inhibits field reporting more than it helps.
- 6. Tab 8 has four options. The third is to have DIA get out of the business on a national level and leave it to CIA. (Manpower, etc. are not discussed) This is the proper place to begin in my opinion. The approach ought to be that DIA like everyone else can no longer afford totally separate and independent facilities for everything. They, like the rest of us, must accept more interdependence, i.e., they'll just have to accept reliance on an organization that they don't control.
- 7. General Graham plans to discuss this "Report of the Task Force on the DoD Biographic Program" at a meeting of the Military Intelligence Board (MIB) on 14 May 1975. He then plans to send a letter to Mr. Colby saying: (a) DIA recommends the creation of the NBIPC; (b) the IC Staff should work out the details and (c) the NBIPC should get its guidance and direction from the Human Sources Committee.
- 8. If Gen. Graham does send such a letter, I recommend we reply by saying:


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a. We agree that there would be efficiencies in combining military biographics with the rest of the biographic operation already in CIA.

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- c. Creating the NBIPC would destroy many of the efficiencies in the current CIA/CRS/ISG operation. The analysts in CRS/ISG handle other information retrieval functions in addition to biographics; they screen incoming documents for several files at the same time.
- d. We prefer to have slots transferred to CIA to handle military biographics; we will guarantee biographic service to DoD at whatever level can be provided by the number of slots DIA gives us.
- e. The concept of the NBIPC would in the long run be very damaging, in my view, to your concept of better integrated intelligence output. If the established system is reasonable for biographic output, why not then use it for political, economic, geographic, etc., intelligence. It also flies in the face of what I consider a reasonable point of view about "service of common concern" within a Central Intelligence Agency. The NBIPC concept says, in effect, that service of common concern won't wouldn't work unless it is put into a joint organization. CRS history, on the contrary, demonstrates that "service of common concern" is an effective and economical way of getting lots of work done for lots of people. Its success ought not to cause its destruction.



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